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Crime as a Business,  
Business as a Crime
Josip Kregar, Antonija Petričušić
“Behind every great fortune there is a crime.”
Honore de Balzac
Purpose: 
This paper endorses the claim that in transitional societies the line between 
business and crime is elusive because weak states foster a legal order that is formalistic, 
bureaucratic, politically biased and prone to corruption. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: 
Three elements are discussed in the paper. First, the paper briefly analyses 
legal and institutional state of affairs in transitional Western Balkans societies 
that condone organised crime. Secondly, it investigates the phenomenology of the 
(corruptive) crime behaviour, explaining how it managed to integrate into society 
in the context of a weak state. Thirdly, the paper investigates why state policies 
and measures fail to fight crime as the business. In this part the paper contests a 
traditional definition of criminal organisation as a hierarchical one, claiming that 
mafias are not organizations in a traditional sense. 
Findings: 
The paper emphasizes that the fight against organised crime is not just a fight 
against individuals or individual criminal behaviour; but a fight to increase the 
efficiency of the government. The paper furthermore asserts that better understand 
of the organised crime problem can occur only if its fighting and addressing 
happens from the point of view of a good governance. Namely, the precondition to 
fight against organised crime or parallel activity requires increased efficiency and 
capacity of governmental institutions.
Originality/Value: 
This paper adds to the academic and practical understanding of the organised 
crime in the post-transitional settings. Apart from being instructive and up-to-
dated source of information for the regional setting it deals with, the paper sheds a 
new light on understanding of organised crime.
UDC: 343.3/.7
Keywords: organised crime, organisation, transition, money laundering, 
corruption, good governance, South-Eastern Europe
1  INTRODUCTION
There has always been a trait of organised crime in business activities (see e.g. 
Block & Chambliss, 1981; Ruggiero, 1985, 1996; Burrows & Hopkins, 2005; Tilley 
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& Hopkins, 2008). However, in transitional societies the line between business and 
crime is particularly elusive. The moral norms from predemocratic and egalitarian 
communities are incapable to cope with emerging and sophisticated crime. The 
legal order in such societies is formalistic, whereas bureaucracy is politically biased 
and prone to corruption. The police and judiciary do not have enough power and 
authority, being accompanied with a lack of a political will to fight crime. 
Common perception of organised crime usually has in mind a picture of a 
really big Weberian type of organization, with hierarchy, with rules, with wages, 
with promotion and career (compare e.g. Peters, 1988). In this paper we will prove 
that criminal organisations are not such a type of (bureaucratic) organization. 
Mafias are groups who are surviving because they are very closely connected. 
The hypothesis this paper attempts to prove is that it is therefore impossible to 
fight against organised crime by eliminating just the top of the groups since top 
positions are easily replaceable by newcomers. Eliminating just a few of leaders 
therefore is not a solution. 
Second hypothesis this paper is putting forwards argues that the line between 
legal and illegal business activities is very flexible in countries in transition. This 
paper therefore emphasizes that the fight against organised crime is not just a fight 
against individuals or individual criminal behaviour; it is a fight to increase the 
efficiency of the government. The paper furthermore asserts that better understand 
of the organised crime problem can occur only if its fighting and addressing 
happens from the point of view of a good governance. Namely, the precondition to 
fight against organised crime or parallel activity requires increased efficiency and 
capacity of governmental institutions.
2  THREAT AND RISKS
2.1  Weak States and Organized Crime as a Threat to Democracy
A weak state facilitates the formation of parallel structures which have real power, 
organized crime and corruption. Consequently, legal, social, even physical security 
of citizens in these conditions is greatly threatened, while the development of civil 
society and democracy is prevented (compare Papić et al., 2001: 247). Organized 
crime therefore constitutes a real threat in new democracies. Even consolidated 
democracies such as Slovenia, Chech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary or 
Croatia do have affairs with organized crime, cases that indicate new form of 
criminal activities. Across South-Eastern Europe countries have been concerned 
with long-term waves of drug trafficking, prostitution, money laundering. 
Comprehensive and comparative studies of transitional economy show that flow 
of capital and profit from illegal activities has a considerable influence (compare 
e.g. Schroeder & Friesendorf, 2009; Giatzidis, 2007; Sergi & Qerimi, 2006). The 
studies of transitional government show that governments are weak and not 
capable, or are corrupted, to fight organized crime. Weak states are the most 
dangerous elements of instability and the most likely source of new trouble spots 
in the decade to come. It is therefore possible to claim that all states have organized 
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crime, but in some states, the organized crime has a state. In short, organized crime 
in transitional democracies is just not the problem of criminology and deviance. 
Being the problem of the weak states, organised crime causes that criminals are 
doing something, whereas the weak states are doing nothing or not enough.
The main problem in weak states is a weakness of state institutions, which 
results in the incapacity of these countries to absorb financial assistance towards the 
successful implementation of reforms. Deformation of democracy and democratic 
institutions, corruption and organized crime were identified as the main sources 
of the weakness of the states in the region. Without creating domestic stability, the 
countries have nothing to offer to one another in the process of reconstruction. 
Rather, they threaten one-another with the spillover of instability.
2.1.1 Systemic Conditions for the Rise of Organised Crime
In countries in transition that were recently moreover involved in armed conflicts, 
the line between legal and illegal business activities is very flexible. Thorstein 
Veblen has noted in his seminal book on leisure class that »[t]he generation which 
follows a season of war is apt to witness a rehabilitation of the element of status, 
both in its social life and in its scheme of devout observances and other symbolic 
or ceremonial forms […] advancing wave of sentiment favoring quasi-predatory 
business habits, insistence on status, anthropomorphism, and conservatism 
generally. The more direct expressions of the barbarian temperament, such as the 
recrudescence of outlawry and the spectacular quasi-predatory careers of fraud 
run by certain ‘captains of industry’« (Veblen, 2007: 283).
Riggs noted that »[i]n societies where formal economic and administrative 
models provide relatively accurate images of reality it is practical to study the 
models …but where the formal models are far removed from reality such study of 
legal and administrative models become increasingly ‘legalistic’« (Riggs, 1964). In 
many cases legal activity has to be supported by disobedience to the law. The people 
are investing a lot of efforts in order to avoid some rules, trying to bribe officers, 
courts or some important politicians. They do perceive as necessary such type of 
behaviour. This is illegal, but sometimes they are using behaviour or tools which 
are completely legal but not acceptable. Not just from the moral point of view but 
also because of open and honest competition in the market. It is therefore possible 
to observe the economic change in transitional countries in the Balkans through 
a lens of organized crime. The days of privatization, denationalization, return of 
property and transformation of social and legal categories in the new capitalist 
system can be described as the days of semi-legal activity. Formally, legalistically, 
those activities were not contrary to legal provisions, but in reality this produced a 
lot of risky situations which are actually opportunities for organized crime which 
has some capital to invest, influence to use, to get some advantages. Organised 
crime is the answer, actually organised crime has some advantages against the 
uncertainties we face in transition.
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2.1.2 Economics of Crime
Ruggiero argues that the most influential forms of corporate and organised 
crime flourish exactly where wealth and power is (Ruggiero, 1996), similarly to 
Sutherland’s claim that »wealth, rather than poverty causes crime« (ibid: 156). 
In transitional societies organized crime can be considered as a product of the 
rise of unorganized market economy. Subsequently, line between business and 
crime in such economies is thin (Kaufmann & Siegelbaum 1997; Kaufmann, 1998; 
Hellman, Jones, Kaufmann, & Schankerman, 2000; Hignett, 2010). Privatizations, 
denationalization, not transparent return of property, transformation of specific 
socialist legal categories into clear legal standard are also premium possibilities for 
personal gains. In intention, such transformation is welcomed by all. In reality it 
is misused by few. Legally everything was correct. In orderly work of enterprises 
and companies, the entrepreneurs try to find loopholes in legislation regarding 
public procurements, taxation, urban planning and permits, judicial procedures. 
The corruptions seem to be grease to slow administration. 
The most challenging opportunity for a spread of organized crime in 
transitional societies in South-Eastern Europe was bureaucratically organized and 
purely performed privatization of state (social) ownership. The investigations after 
the fall of new ‘tycoons’ shows that the damages are enormous, the all economy 
is under serious threats after billions dollars disappeared in ‘safe heavens’ of the 
off shore companies. Tens of such ‘entrepreneurs’ were prosecuted but only a few 
sentenced. Formally, the big robbery was legal. In addition to this, organised crime 
flourished in 1990s across the Balkan peninsula due to the fact that countries of the 
region were involved in armed conflicts. Such a situation allowed for illegal traffic 
of weapons, traffic of narcotics, human trafficking, which all happened under 
political protection and consent. 
For example, statistics of convictions and sentences in Croatia reveal that that 
organised crime is appearing and becoming from time to time the decisive element 
in economic and political competition. Organised crime has penetrated into 
classical centres of banking and profit: banks, tourism, state and local monopolies, 
and moreover, into politics. Illustratively, there were just a few sentences against 
organized crime in Croatia; all others are realized under a rule of ‘no sufficient 
proof’. Two big courts proceeding against mafia were conducted in Croatia recently- 
for dozens of murders, drug dealing etc. The court procedure of the »trial of the 
decade« was a catastrophe for prosecution and public attorneys. Even the most 
sophisticated investigative tools - including protection of witnesses, inclusion of 
secret services and establishment of the Office for the Prevention of Corruption and 
Organized Crime (USKOK) did not suffice to produce concrete results (Čaldarović 
et al., 2009: 7-8; see also Skorupan, 2000). After two and a half years of proceedings, 
almost all of the accused were released. Only a few of them, and not the organizers 
and the leading figures in criminal organisation, were sentenced because of some 
serious offences, but received minimal punishment. It is apparent that attorneys 
are not capable of fighting against the big money of organised crime, good lawyers 
which they are able to pay and the possibility of the manipulation of public. 
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2.1.3  Status and Social Recognition
The case elaborated above shows furthermore that permanence of organized crime 
and the ineffectiveness to eradicate it is not necessarily result of its organizational 
superiority but consequence of economic and political, just as much of social, 
conditions. Namely, the society remains blind to ceremonial rituals of gangs, 
in a way admiring mafia subculture. In transitional countries, it is not unusual 
that organized crime has support in public. It is considered socially acceptable if 
celebrities and leading politicians are having coffee with persons of the criminal 
milieu. Even the leading public servants accept with a great smile people publicly 
accused or denounced by the media as the organizers of crime. The disappointing 
failure to prosecute organised crime explained above indicates that mafia is not 
just one company but a very active group of people willing and able to influence 
public opinion.
2.2  Examples of Money-Power-Spoils across the Balkans
Criminal organisations are used to legalize or launder the money and the profit 
from the criminal activities by investing in attractive ventures, such as tourism 
and other areas. The recent scandal surrounding the Hypo Bank pictures even 
more in detail the theoretical framework presented above. This regional Austrian 
bank from Carinthia managed to expand in the 1990s from a small, provincial bank 
into a large banking force in the neighbouring Balkans. Investigations into Hypo 
businesses started back in 2007, after it was taken over by BayernLB, a Bavarian 
bank, who soon after discovered that Hypo was reporting false business results, 
detecting €3.75 billion loss. The allegations that are coming out in the process of 
investigations range from suspicions that the bank was used to allow for political 
rise and survival of a Carinthian far-right populist politician Jörg Haider, governor 
of the Austrian province from 1989 to 1991 and again between 1999 and 2008; over 
being engaged in a series of curious investments in the expanding markets, to 
financing and organised crime activities in the Balkans. 
There is an evidence that during the Yugoslav wars money from the Croatian 
government and the Croatian diaspora was illegally used for purchasing weapons 
was funnelled through the bank. The large sums remaining after the war were 
reinvested in Croatia by a coterie of the country’s political elite (The Austrian bank 
at the centre of a growing web of scandal, 2010). According to the information 
provided in the Croatian newspapers, the Hypo Bank carried out the majority of 
business deals with local politicians through a middleman. One of them was an 
Austrian businessman Walter Wolf who was »in the 1990’s ... highly respected in 
Croatia because of his role in helping procure weapons for the Croatian armed 
forces during the Homeland war.« (Biočina, 2010) 
In addition, it is becoming evident that the Hypo Bank financed semi-criminal 
and corrupt elite in the successor states of Yugoslavia. The bank, for example, 
funded audacious construction projects for ex-politicians and former generals in 
Croatia. For example, the former Croatian General Vladimir Zagorac, accused of 
Josip Kregar, Antonija Petričušić
VS_Notranjost_2010_04.indd   371 27.12.2010   11:22:32
372
embezzlement of state money and money laundering, was a prominent customer 
of the Hypo-Alpe-Adria Bank (Salzmann & Schwarz, 2009). Austrian press recently 
reported that suspected drug smuggling boss Darko Šarić laundered about EUR 
100mn through loans taken from the bank for the construction of the Belville 
apartment block in New Belgrade (Interior minister on Hypo-Alpe-Adria scandal, 
2010). In its murky Balkans-wide businesses the Hypo Bank had the support of 
representatives from both state and local units of government. By giving them 
favourable loans, it assured supreme business deals. For example, in collusion with 
the local authorities in the Croatian coastal region of Istria large tracks of pristine 
state land were bought at low prices and then sold with a 200 fold price increase, 
after the land was subdivided into plots. 
3  IGNORANCE VS. GOVERNANCE
3.1 Organized Crime: Contesting A Concept
Empirical research on organized crime disagrees if the characteristics of groups or 
of criminal activities are predominant for its definition (see Paoli, 2007; Fijnaut & 
Paoli, 2004). The hierarchical model of criminal organization (Cressey, 1969) was 
accused of imposing a specious conceptual order on a diverse and analytically 
distinct range of actors, activities and harmful consequences. Similarly, researches 
on the informal and formal aspects of an organisation revealed that the formal 
side does not involve a determinate pattern of action (Peters, 1988). The ‘problem 
of organized crime’ has been reformulated to ask, instead, how different crimes of 
a serious impact and magnitude are organized, and what overlaps exist between 
the offences and those who commit them (Edwards & Levi, 2008). Kleemans 
and de Poot (2008) assume a position that group characteristics are predominant 
factor in defining a criminal organization. In their interpretation, relying on social 
opportunity structure theory, organized crime differs from terrorism, corporate 
crime, group crime and other types of crime by the characteristics of the groups 
involved. Groups are considered to be organized crime groups when they are 
focused primarily on obtaining illegal profits; systematically commit crimes with 
serious damage to society; and are reasonably capable of shielding their criminal 
activities from the authorities. Shielding illegal activities from the authorities is 
possible using various strategies: for example, corruption, violence, intimidation, 
store fronts, coded communication, counter-surveillance, media manipulation, 
and the use of experts such as notaries public, lawyers and accountants (Fijnaut, 
Bovenkerk, Bruinsma, & van de Bunt, 1998).
In this paper we challenge organizational aspect of a criminal organization. 
Namely, the definitions of organized crime enlist following qualities: durability 
over time, diversified interests, hierarchical structure, capital accumulation, 
reinvestment, access to political protection and the use of violence to protect 
interests. When discussing organized crime in such a way, it is necessary to agree 
upon a legal definition what an organization is, how many connected persons 
form the organization, and, finally, how to explain a hydra like organization in an 
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organizational sense. When talking about organizations, we often have perception 
of hierarchical organization in which each member has one superior, pyramid like 
organization with clear line and staff principles, capable, fanatic, and evil. When 
picturing mafia-like organized criminal groups, we often only project the picture of 
Weberian type bureaucratic organization, with hierarchy, with rules, with wages, 
with promotion and career (see Peters, 1988). Organised crime is not such a type 
of organization. Mafias are not bureaucratic organizations, they are not even 
companies. 
While there are criminal groups organised along the homogeneous and 
hierarchical lines are not as frequent in comparison to groups that in practice are 
»loose networks of relatively independent members that coalesce around one or 
more prominent criminals« (OCTA, 2006: 12-13). The later networks take up tasks 
of varying structure, length and complexity according to the demand and concrete 
profits (ibid.). However, one should keep in mind that there are organized groups 
characterised by a hierarchical structure. Hierarchical structure “facilitates the 
inherent transnational co-operation of the groups, enhances the role of the head of 
the group and clarifies the allocation of tasks and responsibilities of each member. 
A system of negative sanctions following any failed action is complied with and 
respected but, reversely, positive incentives are also used to ensure group loyalty.” 
(ibid.; compare also Fijnaut & Paoli, 2004)
In other words, mafias are groups who are surviving because they are very 
closely connected. This is the reason why we have a so-called mafia connected by 
ethnicity, origin or national identification. We are talking about the Russian mafia, 
about the Croatian and the Serbian mafia, we are talking about the Sicilian Cosa 
Nostra, the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta, the Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza 
(compare e.g. Paoli, 2007). However, it would be too simplistic to conclude that 
ethnicity is the predominant social glue in the criminal organizations. There is more 
and more recent research on organized crime that reveals that criminal cooperation 
is built not so much on ethnicity as on social relationships between several 
individuals (Kleemans & van de Bunt 1999; Kleemans, 2007). Correspondingly, it 
has been researched and documented that ethnicity can be transformed from a 
‘trait’ into a product of social position, social ties and opportunity structures (Paoli 
& Reuter, 2008)
The criminal organization is not better-organized than state administration. It 
is paradoxical to imagine that they have clear rules of internal promotion, career, 
wages, and merit. They are not bureaucracies but families. The relations are 
personal, the sympathies and subgroupings fleeting, the recruitment contingent; 
the rules rigid put not clear. The organization is not business like - strategies and 
plans are not developed, the marketing is poor and banks are not ready to give 
credits. Personnel in business of organized crime is neither permanent nor career 
oriented. 
When we perceive organised crime in such a sense that challenges its 
organisational structure, we always have in our mind that we cannot fight against 
organised crime by eliminating just the top of the groups. They are a big group, 
and very easily are able to replace the top with newcomers, with the new people 
who are using the opportunity to become the leaders. Eliminating just a few of 
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them will not be the solution. One of the good examples from the Serbian case, 
even if I worry very much about the final result, is that they eliminated not just 
the top, but the substance of the organization. They are like a hydra; when you 
eliminate one head, two heads or organizations arise.
It is furthermore important to note that there is an international, or at least a 
regional dimension of criminal organization activities. Therefore it is necessary to 
establish a link between social ties, ethnicity and crime in the research of organized 
crime. It is not criminals that are penetrating the society, since the methods of 
organised crime are being imported across the national borders. 
3.2 Good Policies Require Good Governance
A democratic political system does not necessarily guarantee and imply clean 
governance (Shen & Williamson, 2005: 329) and democracy should not be 
subscribed exclusively to electoral democracy. Democracy presupposes high 
quality of (good) governance efficiency of institutions, openness of political 
life, rule of law and modern state (both regional and local government). Good 
governance is assured through government’s accountability, allowing for »country’s 
citizens … to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom 
of expression, freedom of association, and free media«; political stability that 
minimizes »the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown 
by unconstitutional or violent means, including political violence and terrorism«; 
government effectiveness, which assures »the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures«, as 
much as »the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility 
of the government’s commitment to such policies«. In addition to those, forming 
characteristic of good governance imply as well regulatory quality, in other words 
»the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development«. Subsequently, 
what is particularly important in the process of organized crime eradication, it 
is essential that the governance takes into account the rule of law. The rule of law 
should be understood as »the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence«. Finally, good 
governance allow for a control of corruption, i.e. »the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as 
well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests« (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2006: 4; Moloney, 2009: 615).
Consequently, the fight against organised crime is not just a fight against 
individuals or individual criminal behaviour; it is a fight to increase the efficiency 
of the government. We can better understand the problem of organised crime if we 
approach it from the point of view of good governance. In short, the precondition to 
fight against organised crime or parallel activities requires increased efficiency and 
capacity of governmental institutions the majority of the South-Eastern European 
countries have yet not achieved.
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4  CONCLUSIONS
The studies of transitional government show that governments are weak and 
not capable, or are even corrupted, to fight organized crime. Weak states are the 
most dangerous elements of instability and a cause for inefficient fight against 
organized crime. It has been elaborated above in the paper that mafias are neither 
bureaucracies nor companies, but groups and networks. They survive not because 
their technical organizational capacities but because they have absolute power of 
leaders, accompanied by weak resistance of clients and the state. Although they 
have a relatively short lifetime and are neither flexible nor adaptable, they manage 
to flourish on fertile ground of social and economic conditions that reproduce 
them. 
The hypothesis this paper furthermore undertake to promote is that it is 
impossible to fight against organised crime by eliminating just the top of the 
groups. Being a big group, they are easily able to replace the top with newcomers; 
new people overtake position of a leader. Eliminating just a few of them is also not 
a solution. It is important that organized crime groups are not only decapitated, but 
that a substance of the organization is destroyed. In this paper we suggested that 
the most efficient way to approach organized crime in transitional South-Eastern 
European societies that were recently involved in armed conflicts it is necessary to 
strengthen and foster good governance of public institutions. 
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